Sergey Kovbasyuk

Information intermediaries should not disclose all past records about market participants: welfare is maximized with short positive records and long but bounded negative records.

Arbitrageurs who publicize new information about their targets optimally concentrate their portfolios and advertising on few targets, and this concentration may be inefficient.

When a seller pays the rating agency and payments are not transparent, ratings are endogenously coarse; with transparent payments, perfectly informative ratings become feasible.

Information explains most of the variation in institutional investors’ IPO profits; commissions and post-IPO trading affect who gets allocations, but not the returns.

When a credit bureau keeps borrowers’ records only for a limited time, lending to borrowers with empty records switches on and off, generating endogenous credit cycles tied to record retention limits.

A platform’s internal currency works as an interest-free loan that expands its borrowing capacity, but widespread use of such currencies may displace fiat money and fuel inflation.

Venture capitalists with limited, correlated information herd into promising fields, so the number of investors in a field becomes a public quality signal — and firms from such fields get higher IPO valuations.